Air Crash victims families against ETOPS 207
Question:
I’ve read in air safety week that the International Air Crash Victims Families Group had itself great concerns about ETOPS extension: "As surviving families of air crashes that occured on trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights over water, with total fatalities, we have a special interest in the proposed regulation… Humm, I wonder if any over-the-water crashes that have occured recently can be attributed to the humber of engines on the aircraft.
Probably not. But then extremists don’t care much about facts. Ed R.
Response:
In advanced aerodrome ATC courses we taught prospective and validated air traffic controllers to treat an engine failure as an emergency. What should be on everybody’s mind is that, again, there is "engine failure" and there is "engine failure" and there have been occasions that the extent of a "situation" is not realised, the situation deteriorates or human nature plays-it-down. Therefore the ATC students left the simulators knowing they should "call the wagons" for a single engine failure, even if the a/c hadn’t called Mayday or Pan.
This is true, and whether I would want the emergency equipment would depend on how the engine failed. If it failed on the ground above 80 knots, and we aborted the takeoff, I would definitely want the equipment. The reason doesn’t have anything to do with the engine, but rather with the likelihood of a brake fire after the abort. Similarly, if the engine failure in flight was also an engine fire, I would definitely want the equipment. I would also want the equipment if the engine failed violently, and there was the possibility of other damage to the airplane. If the engine simply spooled down (failed benignly), I wouldn’t necessarily think the equipment was necessary, but I recognize that they would be there anyway, after we had declared an emergency (and I would always declare an emergency for an engine failure). –Mark Rogers – Hide quoted text — Show quoted text – And it keeps the fireboys on their toes! And they love it. Regards Blippie
Response:
Humm, engine failure, engine failure. Most engine failures occur on the ground during takeoff. (CP’s DC-10 that went to play in the mud at YVR, a Garuda DC-10 with simular problem but pilots aborted takeoff after plane had taken off, uncontained engine failure in a DC-9 on the ground etc etc etc). The one where an engine failure occured in the air was the UA -232 near Sioux City. While the plan’es problem were unrelated to the loss of an engine (they were related to the loss of hydrulics which were broken by flying debris from the broken engine), there was nevertheless an engine failure. A 747 lost all engines for a long moment after flying through volcanic dust. Any airplane would have suffered the same fate. There were 2 occurences where a twin engine jet (767) lost all engines (both!). In both instances, it was due to a simple reason: lack of fuel. All planes would suffer the same fate. In both cases, the plane remained somewhat manoeuvrable after loss of both engines and there were survivors. (AC’s landed "safely" at Gimli, and the ethiopian landed on water). A few days after the SWissair crash, there was a Royal 757 which experienced smoke in cabin over the atlantic. The pilots shut down one engine, smoke cleared, and they returned to the nearest airport (I think it was Goose Bay) which was some hours away. Everyone landed safely. The above example shows how the loss of an engine can be handled quite "routinely" and without danger. Most of the crashes occur when other systems in the airplane are lost (hydraulic, electrical) or when there is a fire/explosion/bomb.
Response:
. Absolutely nothing ROUTINE about a single engine landing
_snip_ . Made thousands of them. What’s the big deal? -vic — Maybe two engines, but one main rotor is enough.
Response:
The ‘big deal’ as you put it, is simply this, a plane with two engines is designed to perform at optimal efficiency when it has two engines, an engine failure is a mechanical problem, that does severely affect the performance of an aircraft. According to the way it was drilled into my head…. that makes it an emergency situation. (Hence the standard procedure of calling out the emergency crews Just because something is practiced in simulation and actuality many times does not make it routine, in fact it’s practiced in simulation so often in part because it’s not routine. To say something is routine would imply a level of normalcy to the situation that in my mind simply doesn’t exist.
– Hide quoted text — Show quoted text -. Absolutely nothing ROUTINE about a single engine landing _snip_ . Made thousands of them. What’s the big deal? -vic — Maybe two engines, but one main rotor is enough.
Response:
Upon an incident-free arrival at MSY, fire trucks were everywhere. In fact, security personnel in the baggage claim area were talking about it. The fire trucks are a standard response by ATC once an emergency has been declared. I feel that declaring an emergency to ATC is warranted, but a preparation for evacuation is unnecessary.
Like I said above, even if you don’t declare an emergency, you might find the fireboys a-waiting. Regards Blippie
Response:
Are you saying that when one engine fails, performance requirements mandate that the remaining engine should be able to perform the function of both engines, or at a minimum, get you to the nearest airport safely?
There is "engine failure" and there is "engine failure". But yes, that is what he is saying. … about 10 minutes prior to arrival at MSY, it was announced that one engine had failed and that we were to assume the crash position strictly as a precautionary measure.
10 minutes out is a pretty hectic time without an engine shut down … Best to get this out of the way and not through it at the pax at, say 2 miles out … Upon an incident-free arrival at MSY, fire trucks were everywhere. In fact, security personnel in the baggage claim area were talking about it.
In advanced aerodrome ATC courses we taught prospective and validated air traffic controllers to treat an engine failure as an emergency. What should be on everybody’s mind is that, again, there is "engine failure" and there is "engine failure" and there have been occasions that the extent of a "situation" is not realised, the situation deteriorates or human nature plays-it-down. Therefore the ATC students left the simulators knowing they should "call the wagons" for a single engine failure, even if the a/c hadn’t called Mayday or Pan. And it keeps the fireboys on their toes! And they love it. Regards Blippie
Response:
[The International Air Crash Victims Families Group said about ETOPS extension:] The fact that two engine aircraft have operated up to now without major accidents should not lull us into a false sense of safety…
No, but it could go some way to allowing ourselves into a true sense of safety. * There is no guarantee that … both engines of a two engine plane may not fail.
True. Maybe somebody has considered this? This is what I tell the layperson when asked about the safety of, say, flying from the UK to Florida in, say, a 747 one year and, say, a 757 the next … A 747 has 4 engines, a 757 has 2. The 747 has twice as many engines. Is the 747 twice as likley to have an engine failure? (I always leave this as a rhetorical question …) * There is no guarantee that if one engine fails the second engine can carry the load of the plane for…(more than) 3 hours…
There’s no gurantee. There’s no guraentee that after an engine failure on a 3/4 engined a/c the remaing engines will get it home … I have the utmost respect for people who have lost loved ones. Their lobbying and energy is a valid and vital park of the aviation safety community – but they are going to have to come up with something better than this …
Response:
So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away? Possibly because of poor communication between cockpit and FAs and FAs not being told this would be a routine landing ? Or perhaps because of a very cautions cockpit crew, knowing that their one-engined plane would be less manoeuvrable in case of a sudden wind change etc decided it was safer to prepare for the worse?
The plane would be just as maneuverable. That is a function of the flight controls, not the engines. The aircraft will not has as much performance when single engine, but the performance will still be more than sufficient. –Mark Rogers
Response:
I find it interesting that people forget that the "thing" -was- designed to fly on one engine. Engine out landings are one of the most practiced manouvers in the simulators (second perhaps only to engine failure on takeoff). They are certainly not routine, but they certainly don’t call for chaos in the cabin. I’ve had only one engine out experience as a passenger, several years ago on a Delta DC-9, and not only were we not told to assume the brace position at 50 miles out, we were NEVER told to assume the brace position because we weren’t going to crash. The pilot calmly informed us that they had shut one of the engines down for mechanical reasons, that we were proceeding to our destination (now 30 minutes away), and that the landing would feel like any other. And it did. Obiviously there was tension in the cabin, but the pilot’s calm explanation of what had happened and what was going to happen went a long way to keeping people relatively calm. The ironic thing is the landing was one of the best landing I’ve ever experienced on a commercial airline flight. -Dan – Hide quoted text — Show quoted text – Ok, well lets look at this from a certain perspective, that of the PIC, basically it goes like this, and engine failure is an emergency situation. period. whether or not the design allows you adequate time to get to your alternate or get her down safely, the thing was designed to fly on two engines, losing one is not a good thing…. ok that’s obvious. What may be a tad less obvious, is that we’re trained (drilled repeatedly more like) in emergency procedures, and it is some of the most crucial. And most of the training amounts to… you play it by the book, whether you’re 100 miles out or 2 miles out. You’re right, alarming the pax is not something anyone wants to do, but killing them is even less appealing, so in an emergency situation nothing is normal, especially a landing, you’re not going to ‘assume’ the position at 10,000ft in the air, you do it on landing, so the proximity to the airport makes it even more critical in this case, not less. One of the most difficult problems any Captain faces is how to inform his passengers of an emergency situation and not alarm them especially to the point of panic, where they’re going to have difficulty following instructions. (you should have heard the class on telling a passenger… gee if we go down and I’m dead and you’re not this is where the ELT is and this is how to make sure its working… but don’t worry I know what I’m doing. *snicker*) Vicky Fraser
Response:
[snip] Are you saying that when one engine fails, performance requirements mandate that the remaining engine should be able to perform the function of both engines, or at a minimum, get you to the nearest airport safely? The remaining engine must be capable of getting the airplane to the nearest airport, yes. That’s a major part of the ETOPS requirements. No point in fooling around with a twin if the single-engine performance stinks.
The requirement has nothing to do with ETOPS. Any aircraft in commercial service must be able to continue a takeoff after an engine failure, and certainly to an alternate while at cruise. ETOPS simply specifies how close the alternate must be to a twin engine aircraft over the water. –Mark Rogers
Response:
Question: With a single engine, how difficult is it to land a 737 and what sort or angle to the runway would the plane have assuming no corss-winds ? And is such angle well within safety limits ?
The angle for a single engine would be no different than two engines. That’s the main reason why we have a rudder (engine failures). The nose is still pointed straight down the runway (crosswind or not). –Mark Rogers
Response:
Are you saying that when one engine fails, performance requirements mandate that the remaining engine should be able to perform the function of both engines, or at a minimum, get you to the nearest airport safely?
Actually, the performance requirements for any aircraft in commercial service are significantly better than that. The aircraft must be able to continue a takeoff after an engine fail at the lowest speed where stopping on the runway is no longer possible. The aircraft must then also meet certain climb and enroute requirements. You are required to have sufficient performance to have an engine failure while still on the ground, climb out, fly to the destination and land. (There are certain exceptions to this involving driftdown alternates, but that gets much more complicated) The reason I ask is that about 7 or 8 years ago, on a WN flight from HOU to MSY, about 10 minutes prior to arrival at MSY, it was announced that one engine had failed and that we were to assume the crash position strictly as a precautionary measure. I know it was the FA who made the crash position announcement, because I clearly remember her shaky voice. Just don’t remember if it was also she who announced the engine failure, or if the Captain made that announcement. So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away?
Well, this is a good question. The answer basically involves training and psychology. Engine failures are very rare, and although sufficient performance exists to continue the flight, the FARs require a landing at the nearest suitable alternate after a failure. This type of scenario also necessitates declaring an emergency to ATC, in order to receive priority. Pilot and Flight Attendant training is also a factor. For a long time, we only had two ways to prepare the passengers for landing. It was either a routine landing, or a preparation for evacuation. This may still be the way it is at some airlines. Therefore, after the flight crew has declared an emergency to ATC, and informed the FAs and passengers of the problem, the logical thing to do was to prep the cabin. IMHO, this is not necessary if the only problem is a failed engine. A few years ago, my airline instituted a new procedure called a "cabin advisory". This essentially advises the FAs that a problem exists and that they should review their evacuation procedures, but a normal landing is expected. The passengers are not asked to assume brace positions. Contrast this to a cabin prep for evac, where the FAs will initiate an evacuation immediately after the aircraft has stopped if they have not received a "remain seated" announcement from the cockpit. Single engine landings were the examples used to train crews when to use the "cabin advisory" procedure. Upon an incident-free arrival at MSY, fire trucks were everywhere. In fact, security personnel in the baggage claim area were talking about it.
The fire trucks are a standard response by ATC once an emergency has been declared. I feel that declaring an emergency to ATC is warranted, but a preparation for evacuation is unnecessary. –Mark Rogers
Response:
So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away? Possibly because of poor communication between cockpit and FAs and FAs not being told this would be a routine landing ?
Absolutely nothing ROUTINE about a single engine landing Or perhaps because of a very cautions cockpit crew, knowing that their one-engined plane would be less manoeuvrable in case of a sudden wind change etc decided it was safer to prepare for the worse?
Not overly cautious at all, it is the procedure to be prepared for the worst, in all emergency situations. Vicky
Response:
I’ve read in air safety week that the International Air Crash Victims Families Group had itself great concerns about ETOPS extension: "As surviving families of air crashes that occured on trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights over water, with total fatalities, we have a special interest in the proposed regulation… We have great concerns about the request extension of the range of separation between airports for two engine aircraft… The fact that two engine aircraft have operated up to now without major accidents should not lull us into a false sense of safety… * There is no guarantee that in a worst-case scenario both engines of a two engine plane may not fail. * There is no guarantee that if one engine fails the second engine can carry the load of the plane for…(more than) 3 hours… It is suggested that a study be made to create a catastrophic insurance rider to cover the cost which may be incurred in case of increased risk of operating two engine planes over vast expanses of water…" (Air Safety week 06/21/1999)
Response:
I’ve read in air safety week that the International Air Crash Victims Families Group had itself great concerns about ETOPS extension: "As surviving families of air crashes that occured on trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights over water, with total fatalities, we have a special interest in the proposed regulation…
Humm, I wonder if any over-the-water crashes that have occured recently can be attributed to the humber of engines on the aircraft.
Response:
I’ve read in air safety week that the International Air Crash Victims Families Group had itself great concerns about ETOPS extension: "As surviving families of air crashes that occured on trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights over water, with total fatalities, we have a special interest in the proposed regulation… We have great concerns about the request extension of the range of separation between airports for two engine aircraft…
No offense, but they really don’t have any idea what they are talking about. I’ve already written extensively on why 2 engine operations can be considered safer than 4 (or 3) engines, and I will therefore not reiterate these reasons. Even if you don’t agree with that line of reasoning, there will be significant new safety enhancements imposed on the aircraft and the operation to increase from 180 ETOPS to 207 ETOPS. Additionally, the amount of time spent more than 180 minutes from an alternate is very small on the proposed Pacific routes (the only ones considered for 207 ETOPS). The ability to have a small portion of the flight (measured in minutes) at more than 180 minutes significantly changes the type of routes that can be flown. These new routes are hours shorter than the 180 ETOPS routes, resulting in an overall reduction in the average distance to an alternate. All of this with new safety enhancements. ALPA (and others) support this proposal. The fact that two engine aircraft have operated up to now without major accidents should not lull us into a false sense of safety… * There is no guarantee that in a worst-case scenario both engines of a two engine plane may not fail.
The additional maintenance and operating requirements actually makes multiple failures much less likely on ETOPS aircraft than non-ETOPS aircraft. * There is no guarantee that if one engine fails the second engine can carry the load of the plane for…(more than) 3 hours…
Of course that is guaranteed by performance requirements. –Mark Rogers
Response:
Am I nuts? Except for a couple of crashes on takeoff or shortly thereafter, has there been *any* "total fatalities" transatlantic or transpacific flight in the last two decades from a major carrier that crashed because of engine failure. I’m thinkin’ they all got shot out of the sky or blew up or caught fire. And the proximity of the diversion airport really wasn’t an issue in the SQ crash…because they decided to make a relatively smooth, cautious approach. Someone correct me, please. –Bill – Hide quoted text — Show quoted text – I’ve read in air safety week that the International Air Crash Victims Families Group had itself great concerns about ETOPS extension: "As surviving families of air crashes that occured on trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights over water, with total fatalities, we have a special interest in the proposed regulation… Humm, I wonder if any over-the-water crashes that have occured recently can be attributed to the humber of engines on the aircraft.
Response:
* There is no guarantee that if one engine fails the second engine can carry the load of the plane for…(more than) 3 hours… Of course that is guaranteed by performance requirements. [snip] Are you saying that when one engine fails, performance requirements mandate that the remaining engine should be able to perform the function of both engines, or at a minimum, get you to the nearest airport safely?
The remaining engine must be capable of getting the airplane to the nearest airport, yes. That’s a major part of the ETOPS requirements. No point in fooling around with a twin if the single-engine performance stinks. [snip] So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away?
wouldn’t that depend on the failure? which is worse, assuming crash positions when not necessary or not assuming crash positions when you should have? — Bob (I think people can figure out how to email me…) (replace ihatessppaamm with my name (rnoel) and hw1 with mediaone)
Response:
So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away? wouldn’t that depend on the failure? I really don’t know. Would it?
well, can we imagine engine failures that aren’t isolated to the engine but also effect other important systems? That DC-10 (?) engine failure at Sioux city (?) did more than cause the loss of an engine. Or perhaps the engine was shutdown because of an engine fire, possibly damaging some other aircraft system. which is worse, assuming crash positions when not necessary or not assuming crash positions when you should have? You know, I was kind of expecting an answer like this, but my purpose in asking was in regards to unnecessarily alarming the pax. Of course, if there was a possibility that the crash position would be necessary, then by all means, make the announcement. I’m just wondering if such an announcement was really necessary (not suggesting that it wasn’t, just wondering) given the fact the engine failed only 10 minutes prior to arrival at the scheduled airport.
sorry, I just wasn’t too interested in speculating that the FA screwed up. maybe it’s the standard procedure for that airline. — Bob (I think people can figure out how to email me…) (replace ihatessppaamm with my name (rnoel) and hw1 with mediaone)
Response:
So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away?
Possibly because of poor communication between cockpit and FAs and FAs not being told this would be a routine landing ? Or perhaps because of a very cautions cockpit crew, knowing that their one-engined plane would be less manoeuvrable in case of a sudden wind change etc decided it was safer to prepare for the worse?
Response:
* There is no guarantee that if one engine fails the second engine can carry the load of the plane for…(more than) 3 hours… Of course that is guaranteed by performance requirements. –Mark Rogers
I have snipped the entire post, except that which I’m replying, so please let me know if what I’m posting below is out of context, as that is not my intent. Are you saying that when one engine fails, performance requirements mandate that the remaining engine should be able to perform the function of both engines, or at a minimum, get you to the nearest airport safely? The reason I ask is that about 7 or 8 years ago, on a WN flight from HOU to MSY, about 10 minutes prior to arrival at MSY, it was announced that one engine had failed and that we were to assume the crash position strictly as a precautionary measure. I know it was the FA who made the crash position announcement, because I clearly remember her shaky voice. Just don’t remember if it was also she who announced the engine failure, or if the Captain made that announcement. So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away? Upon an incident-free arrival at MSY, fire trucks were everywhere. In fact, security personnel in the baggage claim area were talking about it.
Response:
- Hide quoted text — Show quoted text – * There is no guarantee that if one engine fails the second engine can carry the load of the plane for…(more than) 3 hours… Of course that is guaranteed by performance requirements. [snip] Are you saying that when one engine fails, performance requirements mandate that the remaining engine should be able to perform the function of both engines, or at a minimum, get you to the nearest airport safely? The remaining engine must be capable of getting the airplane to the nearest airport, yes. That’s a major part of the ETOPS requirements. No point in fooling around with a twin if the single-engine performance stinks. [snip] So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away? wouldn’t that depend on the failure?
I really don’t know. Would it? which is worse, assuming crash positions when not necessary or not assuming crash positions when you should have?
You know, I was kind of expecting an answer like this, but my purpose in asking was in regards to unnecessarily alarming the pax. Of course, if there was a possibility that the crash position would be necessary, then by all means, make the announcement. I’m just wondering if such an announcement was really necessary (not suggesting that it wasn’t, just wondering) given the fact the engine failed only 10 minutes prior to arrival at the scheduled airport.
Response:
announcement was really necessary (not suggesting that it wasn’t, just wondering) given the fact the engine failed only 10 minutes prior to arrival at the scheduled airport.
I wouldn’t worry about a single remaining engine failing if there is 10 or 120 minutes left. But for landing, I would be a tad more conscious of the fact that with one asymetric engine, the pilots don’t have the freedom to maneouver as they would with 2 engines and the landing phase if when they might need this the most. It *might* also have to do with the fact that the airplane may have to land at an angle to the runway and this may make a tad bumpy landing (or parhaps, if angle is too much, cause plane to flip ?) Question: With a single engine, how difficult is it to land a 737 and what sort or angle to the runway would the plane have assuming no corss-winds ? And is such angle well within safety limits ?
Response:
- Hide quoted text — Show quoted text – The reason I ask is that about 7 or 8 years ago, on a WN flight from HOU to MSY, about 10 minutes prior to arrival at MSY, it was announced that one engine had failed and that we were to assume the crash position strictly as a precautionary measure. I know it was the FA who made the crash position announcement, because I clearly remember her shaky voice. Just don’t remember if it was also she who announced the engine failure, or if the Captain made that announcement. So if performance requirements would mandate that the second engine should perform adequately for (more than) 3 hours, why would we have been asked to take the crash position when the airport was clearly less than 100 miles away? Upon an incident-free arrival at MSY, fire trucks were everywhere. In fact, security personnel in the baggage claim area were talking about it.
Ok, well lets look at this from a certain perspective, that of the PIC, basically it goes like this, and engine failure is an emergency situation. period. whether or not the design allows you adequate time to get to your alternate or get her down safely, the thing was designed to fly on two engines, losing one is not a good thing…. ok that’s obvious. What may be a tad less obvious, is that we’re trained (drilled repeatedly more like) in emergency procedures, and it is some of the most crucial. And most of the training amounts to… you play it by the book, whether you’re 100 miles out or 2 miles out. You’re right, alarming the pax is not something anyone wants to do, but killing them is even less appealing, so in an emergency situation nothing is normal, especially a landing, you’re not going to ‘assume’ the position at 10,000ft in the air, you do it on landing, so the proximity to the airport makes it even more critical in this case, not less. One of the most difficult problems any Captain faces is how to inform his passengers of an emergency situation and not alarm them especially to the point of panic, where they’re going to have difficulty following instructions. (you should have heard the class on telling a passenger… gee if we go down and I’m dead and you’re not this is where the ELT is and this is how to make sure its working… but don’t worry I know what I’m doing. *snicker*) Vicky Fraser
Response:
Filed under: Lobbying
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