Further Constitutional Amendments Are Pointless

Question:

Attempting to get back on Track… Further Constitutional Amendments are pointless since the Supreme Court consistently demonstrates its refusal to force the government to respect existing Amendments. The most recent example is the Suprem Court’s refusal to hear the Hickman case in which the 9th Circuit Court asserted that individuals have no right to own firearms. By refusing to hear the case the Supreme Court makes Hickman a citeable case by anyone who wishes to eliminate private ownership of firearms. The Supreme Court acted similarly in the Morton Grove, Illinois case where the city council made possession of handguns by private citizens illegal. The Supreme Court apparently has decided that reinterpreting the Constitution is ever so much quicker and easier than waiting for the nation to go through the tedious process of Amending the Constitution as used to be required. Besides, the country probably wouldn’t approve the Amendments the Courts want. So There! — Dave Feustel http://feustel.mixi.net

Response:

Here is the entire discussion concerning Admiralty courts:

And here are more examples of the lies, misrepresentations, and unreliable research that pervade it: The Constitution was a commercial compact between states,

The convention which framed the Constitution was, indeed, elected by the state legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a request that it might ‘be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each state, by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification.’… From these conventions the Constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ in the name of the people…. _McCulloch v. Maryland_, 17 U.S. 316, 403-04 (1819) *** Don’t be thrown by the fact they are talking about the sea, and that it doesn’t apply to land, I will prove to you that Admiralty law has come on land. Next a court case: "Pursuant to the "Law of the Flag", a military flag does result in jurisdictional implication when flown. The Plaintiff cites the following: "Under what is called international law, the law of the flag, a shipowner who sends his vessel into a foreign port gives notice by his flag to all who enter into contracts with the shipmaster that he intends the law of the flag to regulate those contracts with the shipmaster that he either submit to its operation or not contract with him or his agent at all." Ruhstrat v. People, 57 N.E. 41, 45, 185 ILL. 133, 49 LRA 181, 76 AM.

First of all, this case is badly miscited. The quote beginning on the third line is from _Ruhstrat_, but the introductory text is of unknown origin. The string cites for _Ruhstrat_ are also incomplete; they should be "57 N.E. 41, 185 Ill. 133, 49 L.R.A. 181, 76 Am.St.Rep. 30." The year of decision, 1900, is also absent. Second, the quote contains errors that, while not significantly altering its meaning, are suggestive of unreliable research. Third, the quote is taken out of context, which clearly indicates that all that is at issue is the use of a flag on a seagoing ship. The flag is used, in the prosecution of commerce upon the high seas, as a symbol of nationality. The nationality of a ship is determined by the flag which it carries. A ship, navigating under the flag and pass of a foreign country, is to be considered as bearing the national character of the country under whose flag she sails. Under what is called in international law ‘the law of the flag,’ a shipowner who sends his vessel into a foreign port gives notice by his flag to all who enter into contracts with the shipmaster that he intends the law of that flag to regulate those contracts, and that they must either submit to its operation or not contract with him or his agent at all. *** – Hide quoted text — Show quoted text -It was up to the Supreme Court to stop Congress and say NO! The Constitution did not give you that power, nor was it intended. But no, the courts began a long train of abuses, here are some excerpts from a few court cases. "This power is as extensive upon land as upon water. The Constitution makes no distinction in that respect. And if the admiralty jurisdiction, in matters of contract and tort which the courts of the United States may lawfully exercise on the high seas, can be extended to the lakes under the power to regulate commerce, it can with the same propriety and upon the same construction, be extended to contracts and torts on land when the commerce is between different States. And it may embrace also the vehicles and persons engaged in carrying it on (my note – remember what the law of the flag said when you receive benefits from the king.) It would be in the power of Congress to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon its courts, over the cars engaged in transporting passengers or merchandise from one State to another, and over the persons engaged in conducting them, and deny to the parties the trial by jury. Now the judicial power in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, has never been supposed to extend to contracts made on land and to be executed on land. But if the power of regulating commerce can be made the foundation of jurisdiction in its courts, and a new and extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known and admitted limits, may be created on water under that authority, the same reason would justify the same exercise of power on land." Propeller Genessee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh et al. 12 How. 443 (U.S. 1851)

At issue in _Fitzhugh_ was whether district courts had jurisdiction over inland waterways. The Court ruled that they did, but on the basis of Article III admiralty jurisdiction, not the Article I commerce power. The above paragraph, in context, explains why the Court ruled that the commerce power could _not_ be the basis for the jurisdiction of the courts. Nor can the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States be made to depend on regulations of commerce. They are entirely distinct things, having no necessary connection with one another, and are conferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct grants. The extent of the judicial power is carefully defined and limited, and Congress cannot enlarge it to suit even the wants of commerce, nor for the more convenient execution of its commercial regulations. And the limits fixed by the Constitution to the judicial authority of the courts of the United States, would form an insuperable objection to this law, if its validity depended upon the commercial power. This power is as extensive upon land as upon water. The Constitution makes no distinction in that respect. And if the admiralty jurisdiction, in matters of contract and tort which the courts of the United States may lawfully exercise on the high seas, can be extended to the lakes under the power to regulate commerce, it can with the same propriety and upon the same construction, be extended to contracts and torts on land when the commerce is between different states. And it may embrace also the vehicles and persons engaged in carrying it on. It would be in the power of Congress to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon its courts, over the cars engaged in transporting passengers or merchandise from one state to another, and over the persons engaged in conducting them, and deny to the parties the trial by jury. Now the judicial power in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, has never been supposed to extend to contracts made on land and to be executed on land. But if the power of regulating commerce can be made the foundation of jurisdiction in its courts, and a new and extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known and admitted limits, may be created on water under that authority, the same reason would justify the same exercise of power on land. 53 U.S. 443, 452-53. *** And all the way back, before the U.S. Constitution John Adams talking about his state’s Constitution, said: "Next to revenue (taxes) itself, the late extensions of the jurisdiction of the admiralty are our greatest grievance. The American Courts of Admiralty seem to be forming by degrees into a system that is to overturn our Constitution and to deprive us of our best inheritance, the laws of the land. It would be thought in England a dangerous innovation if the trial, of any matter on land was given to the admiralty." Jackson v. Magnolia, 20 How. 296 315, 342 (U.S. 1852)

First, this case is badly miscited. The quote appears on page 330, and the case was decided in 1857. Second, the quote contains errors that are not only suggestive of unreliable research but do seem intended to alter its meaning. Third, in context the passage clearly refers not to a state constitution but the English constitution. [T]he extension of the admiralty jurisdiction under the laws, professedly of navigation and trade, for the punishment of offences and misdemeanors, in the reign of George III, was a prominent cause of the American Revolution. In 1768, John Adams, the Coke of the Revolution, prepared for the citizens of Boston instructions to their representatives, Otis, Cushing, Samuel Adams, and Hancock. The citizens said to their representatives, that, ‘next to the revenue itself, the late extensions of the jurisdiction of the admiralty are our greatest grievance. The American courts of admiralty seem to be forming by degrees into a system that is to overturn our constitution, and to deprive us of our best inheritance, the laws of the land. It would be thought in England a dangerous innovation, if the trial of any matter on land was given to the admiralty.’ They refer to the statutes passed in the reign of George III, and declare that they violate Magna Charta. 61 U.S. 296, 330. —

Response:

Further Constitutional Amendments are pointless since the Supreme Court consistently demonstrates its refusal to force the government to respect existing Amendments.

That is because Americans have become wards of the state. The decline to tyranny is now unavoidable. FRIENDS DON’T LET FRIENDS VOTE FOR DEMONRATS!

Response:

The Supreme Court acted similarly in the Morton Grove, Illinois case where the city council made possession of handguns by private citizens illegal.

Given your other postings to these newsgroups, I’d expect you to be *happy* about this. I thought you didn’t like the Supreme Court meddling in the internal affairs of the states. Surely you don’t wish to have them go beyond original intent and apply the 2nd Amendment beyond the Federal Government, do you? Good heavens, you show signs of becoming a Li…Lib… Liber…(I can’t bring myself to say it). –Tim Smith

Response:

: The Supreme Court acted similarly in the Morton Grove, Illinois case : where the city council made possession of handguns by private citizens : illegal. : Given your other postings to these newsgroups, I’d expect you to be : *happy* about this. I thought you didn’t like the Supreme Court meddling : in the internal affairs of the states. Surely you don’t wish to have them : go beyond original intent and apply the 2nd Amendment beyond the Federal : Government, do you? Good heavens, you show signs of becoming a Li…Lib… : Liber…(I can’t bring myself to say it). : –Tim Smith You have absolutely NO IDEA how radically my opinions on the ‘New World Order’ are changing. Stay tuned. — Dave Feustel http://feustel.mixi.net

Response:

Make up your own mind, or the Harvard lawyer will make it up for you. ——- "United States citizen" or "state Citizen": is there a difference? On the face. this discussion might seem to be a matter of semantics, but upon closer inspection of the law, the distinction is quite clear. The term "citizen of the united states" was not defined in the original U.S. constitution, as that term was commonly understood to mean a "citizen of one of the several states of the union.. See Ex Parte Frank Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 wherein it states: By metaphysical refinement, in examining our form of government, it might be correctly said that there is no such thing as a citizen of the United States. But constant usage – arising from convenience, and perhaps necessity, and dating from the formation of the Confederacy – has given substantial existence to the idea which the term conveys. A citizen of any one of the States of the Union, is held to be, and called a citizen of the United States, although technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To conceive a citizen of the United States who is not a citizen of some one of the states, is totally foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and common understanding of the expression as used in the constitution, which must be deduced from its various other provisions. The object then to be obtained, by the exercise of the power of naturalization, was to make citizens of the respective states. Ex parte Knowles, 5 Ca. 300, 302 (1855) Therefore, prior to the alleged ratification of the 14th Amendment, there was no legal definition of a "citizen of the United States", as everyone had primary citizenship in one of the several states. The Constitution referred to the sovereign state citizen, and no one else. Those who went to Washington, D.C. or outside the several states were commonly called "citizens of the United States." In the Constitution for the United States, the term was used to identify state citizens who were eligible under the suffrage laws to hold office, and they were required under the Constitution to have primary allegiance to one of the several states. Since that term was not specifically defined in the U.S. Constitution, Congress in 1868 took advantage of this term and utilized it in the so-called 14th Amendment to describe a NEW type of "citizen" whose primary allegiance was to the federal government, i.e. Washington, D.C. and not to one of the several states of the union. Thus, using the term as used in the U.S. Constitution to mislead and confuse the people as to the true intent and meaning of the Constitution. Many people have mistaken the citizen as denominated in the 14th Amendment to mean the same one in the original constitution, this is in error. The "citizen of the united states" as used in the constitution is not the same as the citizen of the United States used after the 14th Amendment. So all the elected officials are NOT sitting in the office constitutionally, they are merely impostors created by the 14th Amendment. The current President Clinton, is a U.S. citizen, and therefore not the "citizen of the united states" defined in the Constitution for the United States, neither the federal senators nor any congressmen are seated constitutionally. These facts being true, then all the federal laws are invalid for want of constitutionality. The 14th Amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United States. It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United States, except by first becoming a citizen of some state. United States v. Anthony (1874), 24 Fed. Cas. 829 (No. 14,459), 830. We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several states. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a state, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those he has under the other. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). In other words, you do not have to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a state citizen. This was held to be true by the Maryland Supreme Court in 1966 wherein the state: Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen of his state. Crosse v. Bd. of Supvr,s of Elections, 221 A.2d. 431 (1966) The federal government was never given any authority to encroach upon the private affairs of the citizens in the several states of the union, unless they were involved in import or export activity, neither were they given authority to reach a citizen of Germany living in Germany. In fact, the states could refuse to enforce any act of congress, that they felt was outside the intent of the granting of limited powers to the federal government. This is called interposition or nullification. Several state supreme courts have in the past refused to uphold federal laws within their states. In fact, in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 54 (c) shows us that Congress knows and understands that federal laws do not apply within anyone of the several states of the union, but do apply in the Federal State (federal enclave) created by the Buck Act. (c) Application of Terms. As used in these rules the following terms have the designated meanings. "Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession. "State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession" The Buck Act Title 4 U.S.C.S.

Filed under: Activism Politics

XHTML: You can use these tags: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>

TrackBack URL | RSS feed for comments on this post.

Activism Change

Learn, read, react :: Activism